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ABSTRACT
Automobile manufacturers make frequent use of promotions that give cash-back payments. Two
common types of cash-back promotions are rebates to customers, which are widely publicized to
potential customers, and discounts to dealers, which are not publicized. While the payments
nominally go entirely to one party or the other, the real division of the manufacturer-supplied surplus
between dealer and customer depends on what price the two parties negotiate. These two types of
promotions thus form a natural experiment of the effect of information asymmetry on bargaining
outcomes: in the customer rebate case, the parties are symmetrically informed about the availability
of the manufacturer-supplied surplus, while in the dealer discount case, the dealer will generally have
an informational advantage. The aim of this paper is to compare, in appropriate settings and with
appropriate  controls,  the  price  outcomes  of  transactions  conducted  under  these  two  types  of
promotions in order to empirically quantify the effect of this information asymmetry. We show that
customers obtain approximately 80% of the surplus in cases when they are likely to be well-informed
about  the  promotion  (customer  rebate),  and  approximately  35%  when  they  are  likely  to  be
uninformed (dealer discount). For a promotion of average size, this difference translates to customers













Although retail demand for an automobile ﬂuctuates due to changing economic conditions,
seasonality, and the stage of the model’s life cycle, manufacturers rarely vary published retail
and invoice prices of a particular model over the course of the model year. The choice to
have rigid prices is potentially very costly for auto manufacturers: inventory holding costs
for automobiles are high, and so are the costs of changing production schedules to adapt to
current demand. As a result, “incentive promotions” play an important role in automobile
manufacturers’ product market strategies by enabling retail prices to adjust to ﬂuctuating
demand conditions. Incentive promotions take a variety of forms. The most common are
cash rebates to customers, cash rebates to dealers, subsidized interest rates for customers who
ﬁnance through the manufacturer’s captive lending arm, and lease incentives. In this paper, we
focus on the two primary types of cash rebates, which we refer to by their industry terminology,
namely “customer cash” for cash rebates that are directed to customers and “dealer cash” for
cash rebates that are directed to dealers.
Customer cash promotions are always publicized to potential customers, often in prime-time
television advertisements by regional dealer associations. The size of the rebate ranges typically
from $500 to $2000. In practice, customer cash promotions are administered as follows: if a
customer buys the speciﬁed vehicle during the time window of the promotion, then once the
customer and the dealer have negotiated the purchase price, the dealer hands the customer
a check from the manufacturer for the promotion amount. The customer then endorses the
check over to the dealer, and the amount is immediately applied to the agreed-upon purchase
price of the vehicle.
In contrast, dealer cash promotions are not advertised by manufacturers. While it is possible
for a customer to ﬁnd out if a dealer promotion is currently available, customers will not be
2informed about their existence unless they speciﬁcally search in specialized publications, or
more recently through websites such as Edmunds.com. Overall, consumers are much less likely
to be informed about dealer cash promotions than customer cash promotions.
From an economist’s perspective, these two types of promotions provide an interesting
comparison. While the promotion payments are nominally directed to one party or the other,
who ultimately receives the beneﬁt of the promotion depends on the outcome of the price
negotiation process. For example, if a customer buying during a $1000 customer cash rebate
were to agree to a price that is higher by $200 than the price he or she would have negotiated
without the promotion, then the customer’s out-of-pocket expenditure would be lower by only
$800 compared to what he or she would otherwise have paid. The dealer would be reaping
$200 of the beneﬁt of that customer cash promotion. Conversely, if a dealer were induced by a
$1000 dealer cash promotion to agree to a price that is lower by $500 than he or she otherwise
would have, then the customer would obtain $500 of the beneﬁt of the dealer cash promotion.
In short, from an economics perspective, a $1000 customer cash promotion and a $1000 dealer
cash promotion are both $1000 of manufacturer-supplied economic surplus that will be divided
between the two parties through the bargaining process.
The chief diﬀerence between the two promotions is the information environment surround-
ing them: in the customer cash case, both parties know that the surplus is on the table, while
in the dealer cash case, generally only the dealer knows that the surplus is on the table. These
two types of promotions thus form a natural experiment of the eﬀect of information asymmetry
on bargaining outcomes: in the customer cash case, the parties are symmetrically informed
about the availability of the manufacturer-supplied surplus, while in the dealer cash case, the
dealer will generally have an informational advantage. The aim of this paper is to compare,
in appropriate settings and with appropriate controls, the price outcomes of transactions con-
ducted under these two types of promotions in order to draw inferences about how information
3asymmetry aﬀects bargaining outcomes. We think that understanding incentive promotions
is of independent interest since they play a key role in the automotive industry. More impor-
tantly, however, we think that this analysis provides a rare opportunity to examine the eﬀect
of asymmetric information on bargaining outcomes in a product market.1
Our empirical setting overcomes one of the key problems of testing predictions about how
asymmetric information between parties aﬀects bargaining outcomes, which is that researchers
are often unable to observe the nature of the information asymmetry. In our case, the asymme-
try is over a very speciﬁc issue—whether there is a promotion or not and how large it is—and
we can divide our observations sharply into cases in which there is almost certainly symmetric
information and cases in which there is very likely to be asymmetric information.
In examining how information asymmetry between dealers and consumers about manufacturer-
supplied surplus aﬀects the division of this surplus in negotiations, we anticipate that, con-
sistent with the results of a broad set of theoretical bargaining models, customers will obtain
a greater share of the surplus, the better informed they are about the surplus that is to be
divided. This implies that a given promotion amount in the form of customer cash should
lower the ﬁnal transaction price by more than the same promotion amount in the form of
dealer cash.
We draw on methods from the program evaluation literature to estimate how much of
the manufacturer-supplied customer cash and dealer cash is passed on to consumers. Using
both a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach and a regression discontinuity approach, we ﬁnd that
customers obtain 70-90% of the surplus supplied by manufacturers in customer cash promo-
tions, but only 30-40% of the surplus in dealer cash promotions. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction and implies that, for a promotion of average size, consumers receive
1While there is experimental work and also some empirical literature on private information and bargain-
ing in labor disputes, to our knowledge there is next to no empirical work in product markets, except for
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2004)
4approximately $500 more of the surplus if they know that the promotion is in eﬀect.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relevant literature. In section
3 we present the data. In section 4 we discuss relevant estimation issues and our empirical
approach. In section 5 we estimate the pass-through rates of the diﬀerent types of promotions.
In section 6 we test the validity of assumptions that were maintained when identifying these
pass-through rates. In section 7 we consider several extensions to the main result, including
how pass-through varies with competition and demographics. We conclude in section 8.
2 Literature Background
There are two strands of literature that inform this paper. One is the literature on game-
theoretic models of bargaining under asymmetric information. This literature forms the basis
of our prediction that because customers are informed about customer cash and not dealer
cash, they will obtain a greater fraction of customer cash than of dealer cash. Second, our
paper is also related to a literature on manufacturer promotions. We discuss these two strands
in sequence.
2.1 Bargaining under asymmetric information
The segment of the bargaining literature that is relevant to this paper relates information
asymmetries between bargaining parties to the division of surplus in the negotiation. These
models can be found in the large game-theoretic literature on bargaining with incomplete
or private information (see the excellent review papers by Kennan and Wilson (1993) and
Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) for an overview). While the primary focus of this
literature is on whether economically eﬃcient transactions take place, some of the important
papers also make clear predictions with regards to the eﬀect of asymmetric information on the
5division of surplus.
A natural way to model the car buying process is as a dynamic process of bilateral nego-
tiation. The models that apply to our setting follow the seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982),
but assume that one of the bargaining parties has incomplete information about the reserva-
tion price of the opponent. To match our case, it is the buyer who should be thought of as
the uninformed party. Bargaining is typically considered to follow one of two protocols. In a
“buyer-oﬀer game,” only the buyer (the uninformed party) is allowed to make oﬀers, which
the seller is allowed only to reject or accept. If the seller rejects an oﬀer, the buyer can make
another oﬀer. The game ends when the seller accepts an oﬀer. Games of this type can have
multiple Bayesian equilibria (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), p. 399). However, Fudenberg,
Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) show that under the
“stationary equilibrium” reﬁnement, the buyer-oﬀer game allows the buyer to screen seller
types by a series of sequential, increasing price oﬀers. In terms of our empirical prediction,
the salient feature of this equilibrium is that, as long as buyers are not inﬁnitely patient, the
buyer is not able to perfectly screen among the seller types and is therefore worse oﬀ than he
or she would be in a situation in which he or she had complete information about the seller’s
reservation price.
This same prediction also comes out of an “alternating-oﬀer game.” In such a game the
buyer and seller alternate in making proposals. Ausubel and Deneckere (1998) show in such a
model that under the “assuredly perfect equilibrium” reﬁnement, there exists a unique equilib-
rium in which the buyer is able to screen seller types, albeit imperfectly. As in the buyer-oﬀer
game, the buyer’s equilibrium payoﬀ is bounded from above by what he or she could extract
in the complete-information game.
The prediction common to this class of models is that a negotiating party that has in-
complete information about its opponent will obtain a smaller share of the surplus in the
6negotiation than if that party were better informed. In the context of car promotions, we
use the fact that that there is variation between the two types of promotions in how likely
consumers are to be informed about the manufacturer-supplied surplus available in the pro-
motion. The prediction from theory is that buyers should be able to obtain a larger share of
a customer cash promotion (which they know about) than of a dealer cash promotion (which
they are unlikely to know about).
Laboratory experiments support the prediction that an uninformed party obtains less of
the surplus (see Kennan and Wilson (1993) and Roth (1995) for comprehensive surveys). For
example, in an experiment simulating a real estate market, Valley, Blount White, Neal, and
Bazerman (1992) show that transaction prices are lower, conveying greater surplus to the
buyer, when the seller’s reservation price is common knowledge than when it is the private
information of the seller. A similar eﬀect is often found in ultimatum games with one-sided
incomplete information. Croson, Boles, and Murnighan (2003) summarize the results from
these experiments: “These studies consistently show that proposers make (and responders
accept) signiﬁcantly lower oﬀers when responders do not know the size of the pie and when
this lack of information is common knowledge” (p. 145).
Empirical investigations of the eﬀect of asymmetric information on bargaining outcomes in
non-laboratory settings have not been concerned primarily with prices in product markets. In-
stead, the primary area of investigation has been union contract negotiations, and the outcome
of interest has been strike activity and strike duration (Kennan and Wilson 1993, Ausubel,
Cramton, and Deneckere 2002, Tracy 1986, Tracy 1987). Nevertheless, there are two empirical
papers which, like this paper, are concerned with the eﬀects of incomplete information on
negotiated prices. Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2003) analyze how negotiated
prices are aﬀected by whether a buyer used an Internet referral service (Autobytel.com) which
7makes available to consumers purchase-relevant information, including dealer invoice prices.
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2004) relate self-reported measures of how in-
formed a customer was when she purchased a car to the price she paid, ﬁnding that consumers
who report knowing the invoice price of a dealer pay less.
Other empirical bargaining papers have focused on the demographic factors that aﬀect
bargaining outcomes, rather than on the eﬀect of information asymmetries. For example,
Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) examine the eﬀect of diﬀerences between buyer and
seller demographics on the negotiated price of a house. Ayres and Siegelman (1995), Goldberg
(1996), and Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) analyze the eﬀect of buyer’s
race and gender on negotiated prices.
One ﬁnal paper that is related to ours examines the eﬀect of asymmetric information on
prices, but in the context of auctions instead of bargaining. Hendricks and Porter (1988) use
data on bids for drainage leases, which confer the right to extract oil and gas from a particular
tract of land. A company that has already drilled on an adjacent tract has an information
advantage over other bidders on a particular tract, and Hendricks and Porter ﬁnd evidence
that participants bid strategically in accordance with a model that takes this information
asymmetry into account.
2.2 Manufacturer Promotions
Understanding price promotions has been an issue of longstanding interest in the marketing
literature. There is a large literature concerned with game theoretic models of promotions. The
aspects that have been modelled include the choice by manufacturers to oﬀer wholesale promo-
tions to retailers (Lal 1990, Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas 1996, Gerstner and Hess 1991) and the
decisions of retailers to oﬀer promotions to ﬁnal customers either independently (Narasimhan
81988, Varian 1980, Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990, Rao 1991) or in response to manufacturer
promotions (Moorthy 2003, Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland 2001, Tyagi 1999).
The segment of the promotions literature that is most relevant to this paper, however, is
the segment that concerns empirically measuring how much of a manufacturer promotion gets
passed through to ﬁnal customers in the form of lower retail prices. This is an issue that has
been of interest not only to academic researchers, but also to the manufacturers themselves,
who are interested in the eﬀectiveness of their promotional activities in lowering prices to ﬁnal
customers. Blattberg and Neslin (1990) give an overview of the the issues surrounding how
to measure the eﬀect of promotions on retail prices (see chapter 11). Additional empirical
investigations into the rate of pass-through of manufacturer promotions to retail customers
include Besanko, Dub´ e, and Gupta (2004), Chevalier and Curhan (1976), and Walters (1989).
The setting in which the marketing literature has examined rates of pass-through of promo-
tions has been primarily supermarkets. A supermarket setting is much less suited to examining
the question at hand in this paper – namely the eﬀect of information asymmetry on bargaining
outcomes – for several reasons. First, the prices customers pay in supermarkets are posted
rather than negotiated. Second, the promotions used in the supermarket channel do not provide
a clean comparison between symmetric and asymmetric information. For example, packaged
goods manufacturers oﬀer coupons, about which many customers are informed, and “trade
deals” which the ﬁnal customer can’t observe. However, a coupon has a price discriminatory
aspect to it because not all customers who have coupons available ﬁnd it worthwhile to redeem
them (Nevo and Wolfram 2002). This does not apply to customer cash for automobiles be-
cause the promotional amounts are hundreds or thousands of dollars and redemption happens
automatically during closing. Trade deals, on the other hand, have a diﬀerent disadvantage
compared to dealer cash for automobiles for investigating asymmetric information and prices.
The issue with trade deals is that they are discounts that apply to all goods purchased by a
9retailer in a given period of time, not to goods sold by a retailer in that period of time, which
means that retailers can use a trade deal to stock up on inventory without necessarily having
any inducement to lower the retail price.2
3 Data
We have combined two types of data for this analysis. The ﬁrst is data on automobile trans-
actions from a sample of 15-20% of the dealerships in California from September 1998 to
December 2000. The data are collected by a major market research ﬁrm, and include every
transaction within the time period for the dealers in the sample. For each transaction we
observe the exact vehicle purchased (nameplate, model, model year, trim level, body type,
number of doors, engine, etc.). We also observe the price paid for the car, the dealer’s cost of
obtaining the car from the manufacturer, demographic information on the customer, detailed
information on the trade-in vehicle if the customer used a trade-in, and the proﬁtability of the
car to the dealership. We also observe in these data the amount of customer cash rebate, if
any, that applied to the transaction.
In these data, however, we do not observe the dealer cash rebates which were available at
the time of sales. We have thus supplemented these transaction data with promotion listings.
In this second set of data, we observe all types of promotions available during the sample
period, including customer cash, dealer cash, subsidized interest rates (APR incentives), lease
incentives, and incentives given directly to sales managers and sales reps. For each promotion,
we observe the promotion amount, the starting and ending dates of the promotion, and any
2A third type of promotion used by manufacturers who sell to supermarkets is the “scan-back,” which is
analogous to dealer cash in that it pays the retailer the promotional amount for all goods that are sold during
the promotion window. Scan-backs have historically been much less common than trade deals, but are being
used more frequently.
10restrictions on the promotion’s application. The most common kinds of restrictions are that
the promotion is available only in certain regions of the country (or has varying promotion
amounts in diﬀerent areas of the country), or that the promotion is available only for certain
trim levels (or have varying promotion amounts based on trim level).
In this paper, we restrict our attention to cash transactions, namely transactions that are
not leases, and are not ﬁnanced through manufacturer-backed ﬁnancing.3 The reason is that
for these transactions, customer cash and dealer cash are the promotions that are relevant for
pricing. This leaves us with 133,424 transactions. In future work, we hope to explore the eﬀect
of APR incentives and of lease incentives.
3.1 Dependent variable
We will use transaction prices as dependent variables in the estimation. The price observed in
the dataset is the pre-sales tax price that the customer pays for the vehicle, including factory
installed accessories and options, and including any dealer-installed accessories contracted for
at the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car.4
Conceptually, we would like our price variable to measure the customer’s total wealth outlay
for the car. In order to capture this, we make two modiﬁcations to the observed transaction
price. First, we subtract oﬀ the customer cash rebate amount if the car is purchased under
a customer cash rebate since the manufacturer pays that amount on the customer’s behalf.
Second, we subtract from the purchase price any proﬁt the customer made on his or her trade-
in (or add to the purchase price any loss made on the trade-in). The price the dealer pays
3Note that these are cash transactions from the perspective of the dealer, but they need not be cash
transactions from the perspective of the customer. In particular, if a customer has obtained a loan from a
bank, it is a cash transaction from the dealer’s perspective.
4Dealer-installed accessories that contribute to the resale value include items such as upgraded tires or a
sound system, but would exclude options such as undercoating or waxing.
11for the trade-in vehicle minus the estimated wholesale value of the vehicle (as booked by the
dealer) is called the TradeInOverAllowance. Dealers are willing to trade oﬀ proﬁts made on
the new vehicle transaction and proﬁts made on the trade-in transaction, which is why the
TradeInOverAllowance can be either positive or negative. When a customer loses money on
the trade-in transaction he or she is paying for the new vehicle in part in kind with the trade-in
vehicle. By subtracting the TradeInOverAllowance we adjust the negotiated (cash) price to
include this payment.
3.2 Controls
We control for car ﬁxed eﬀects. A “car” in our sample is the interaction of make, model, model
year, body type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level. This leaves 942
thus-deﬁned cars after dropping cars with fewer than 200 sales in our sample. We exclude
these data because the smaller number of observations limits what we learn from these cars
and because we want to be able to estimate car ﬁxed eﬀects to control for many of the factors
that contribute to the price of a car.
To control for time variation in prices, we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if
the car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. A dummy variable WeekEnd speciﬁes
whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday to control for a similar, weekly eﬀect.
In addition, we use weekly dummies for each week in our 121 week sample period (September
1998-December 2000) to control for other seasonal eﬀects and for inﬂation. If there are volume
targets or sales on weekends, near the end of the month, or seasonally, we will pick them up
with these variables.
We control for the number of months between a car’s introduction and when it was sold.
This proxies for how new a car design is and also for the dealer’s opportunity cost of not selling
12the car. Based on the distribution of sales after car introductions, we distinguish between sales
in the ﬁrst four months, months 5-13, and month 14 and later and assign a dummy variable
to each category.
We control for the competitiveness of each dealer’s market. For each dealership we count
the number of dealerships with the same nameplate that fall in a zip code that is within a 10
mile radius of the zip code of the focal dealership. We control for cases where one owner owns
several franchises by counting only the number of separately-controlled entities.
We also control for the income, education, occupation, and race of buyers by using census
data that the data provider matches with the buyer’s address from the transaction record.
The data is on the level of a “block group,” which makes up about one fourth of the area
and population of a census tract. On average, block groups have about 1100 people in them.
Finally, we control the geographic region in which the car was sold (northern or southern
California).
3.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data. Twenty-six percent of transactions in our
sample involve customer cash, and 18% involve dealer cash. The average amount of customer
cash observed for transactions in our sample that involve customer cash is $1242 (median
$1000). The average amount of dealer cash among transactions that involve dealer cash is
$932 (median $700). The average transaction price of a new vehicle in our data is $25,490.
The table also presents customer demographics.
134 Estimation approach
The aim of our paper is to estimate the “treatment eﬀect” of promotions on prices. Our primary
empirical problem is to ﬁnd the correct counterfactual against which to measure this eﬀect.
At an intuitive level, estimating the treatment eﬀect of a promotion means comparing pricing
with a promotion to dealer pricing without a promotion. The chief complication in doing this,
however, is that manufacturers might be more likely to instigate incentive promotions when
prices are either low or declining due to a slump in demand. This means that the price observed
in the periods in which a manufacturer chose not to have a promotion are not necessarily what
the price would have been in the periods in which a manufacturer chose to have a promotion
had it chosen instead not to have a promotion. If we do not correctly account for this in
choosing the counterfactual, we could overestimate the rate at which surplus is passed through
to customers because we would attribute a low customer price to the promotion when part of
the low price might have been attributable to demand conditions.
We use two diﬀerent empirical approaches in this paper, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach,
and a regression discontinuity approach. Conceptually, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
uses the prices of similar cars that are not on promotion to estimate the counterfactual price of
a car that is on promotion at a given time. This is implemented by incorporating week - vehicle
segment ﬁxed eﬀects to control for underlying changes in price. Thus, the estimated change
in price that is attributed to the promotion is the change that is net of the contemporaneous
change in prices of other cars within the same vehicle segment.
An alternative way to estimate the counterfactual price is to use the a car’s own price when
it is not on promotion. Conceptually, this is what our second approach, regression discontinuity,
does. This approach has been used primarily in the program evaluation literature, particu-
larly in education and job training applications. In those applications, researchers must often
14evaluate programs in which participants are not randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups. Such situations include when subjects self-select into treatment, or when treatment is
assigned on the basis of need or some other characteristic which is likely to be related to the
outcome that is the aim of the program. This means that estimating the treatment eﬀect by
regressing outcomes on indicators of treatment is likely to produce biased estimates.
The regression discontinuity approach takes advantage of the fact that even in programs
without random assignment, there are often discontinuities in treatment among subjects who
are otherwise similar in the characteristics that inﬂuence the outcome of interest, and that
these discontinuities are likely to lead to discontinuities in outcomes. The average diﬀerences in
outcomes between groups just to one side and just to the other side of a treatment discontinuity
can give a consistent estimate of the average treatment eﬀect (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw
2001, Imbens and Angrist 1994). For example, Kane (2003) describes a state-funded college
grant program that has a speciﬁc GPA cutoﬀ for eligibility which is unknown to applicants at
the time they apply. Thus, applicants who are close to the cutoﬀ on either side can be used to
estimate the eﬀect of receiving a grant on the probability of enrolling in college. In a similar
example, Van der Klaauw (2002) describes a particular college’s ﬁnancial aid program uses a
scoring method to sort students into ﬁnancial aid categories using a formula based on SAT
score and GPA. Students near the cutoﬀ for each category can be used to estimate the eﬀect
of the size of a ﬁnancial aid oﬀer on the probability of enrolling in a that college.
In this paper, we are interested in estimating the eﬀect of a manufacturer promotion (the
treatment) on an outcome measure, price. As is often the case in the program evaluation
literature, we do not believe that manufacturers apply the treatment randomly. In particular,
we expect that promotions are likely to be applied at times when sales are slow, and when
customers are willing to purchase only if oﬀered relatively low prices.
However, we believe that the underlying demand conditions which determine the rate of
15sales and the customers’ price elasticity is likely to change fairly little over the course of several
weeks.5 Thus, in applying the regression discontinuity approach, we restrict our attention to
one week on either side of when a promotion begins, ends, or changes in the amount of cash
being oﬀered. Even if underlying demand conditions are trending one way or another within
this short window, as long as there is no discontinuous change, except for what is the result
of the promotion, the regression discontinuity approach will consistently estimate at least the
local average treatment eﬀect.
Within the regression discontinuity approach, identiﬁcation would be upset if the customers
who purchase just before a promotion starts and just after diﬀered in some way that was
related to the outcome of interest. This would be the case, for example, if there are deal-prone
customers who are particularly eﬀective negotiators, and who wait to purchase a car until a
promotion is oﬀered.
5 Rebate pass-through
In this section we estimate how much of the manufacturer-supplied surplus is passed through
to customers depending on the type of promotion that was used to supply the surplus. We
hypothesize that in the price negotiation process, customers will obtain a greater share of the
surplus when they are better informed about the existence and size of the promotion; in other
words, we anticipate greater pass-through of customer cash than of dealer cash. However, even
if customers do not know that dealer cash is on the table, we expect that they may still obtain
some of the dealer cash surplus. This is because the dealer will get the promotional payment
from the manufacturer only if a car is actually sold. This gives the dealer an incentive to lower
5We know from industry sources, that there is typically a gap of several weeks between the most recent
information that was used in making the decision to initiate a promotion and the start of the promotion.
16prices to customers more than he or she would have without the promotion in order to entice
customers to complete the sale.
We begin with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to estimate the rate of pass-through,
and then turn to the regression discontinuity approach.
5.1 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
We wish to estimate the eﬀect of customer cash promotions and dealer cash promotions on the
out-of-pocket price that customers pay. Our dependent variable is therefore the vehicle price
net of rebate, which we denote Pijt, the price that customer i pays for vehicle j at date t. The
speciﬁcation we estimate is
Pijt = λcCustCashjt+λdDealCashjt+β1Xi+β2Xjt+β3DealerCompij+µj+τJT +ijt. (1)
CustCashjt and DealCashjt are the amounts of customer cash and dealer cash available for
vehicle j at date t. Since manufacturers typically make promotion decisions by nameplate -
model - model year (e.g. 1999 Pontiac Grand Am), these variables are unique for a nameplate
- model - model year triple. In cases where promotions also vary by region, our promotion
variable will record the promotion as being available only in the region in which it is. Xi
is a vector of the buyer’s individual and neighborhood customer demographic characteristics
including sex, race, income, education, employment type, and home ownership. Xjt is a vector
of control variables some of which are deﬁned only by t (weekend, end of month, and end of
year) and some of which depend on j and t (time since model introduction). DealerCompij is
a measure of how competitive is the dealer at which customer i purchased his or her vehicle;
speciﬁcally, the measure used is the number of competing dealers of the same nameplate within
a 10 mile radius of this dealer. µj are vehicle ﬁxed eﬀects. For these ﬁxed eﬀects, we use a very
17ﬁne deﬁnition of a vehicle, namely the cross product of make, model, model year, body type,
transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level. τJT is a week - vehicle segment
ﬁxed eﬀect where J is the segment (e.g. SUVs, compact cars, etc.) that contains car j and T
is the week that contains purchase date t. The data cover 121 weeks.
The primary variables of interest are λc and λd, which measure the extent to which rebates
are passed through to customers. If either λc or λd is equal to 0, that implies that none of the
surplus from the respective type of promotion is passed through to customers. In this case the
retailer is the sole beneﬁciary of the promotion. If λc or λd is equal to -1, then the customer
obtains the full amount of the respective rebate in the form of a lower price. One can interpret
100 · |λ| as the percentage of the rebate the customer obtains.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating this speciﬁcation. In column 1, the customer cash
coeﬃcient implies that 88% of customer cash is passed through to customers, while 39% of
dealer cash is passed through. This diﬀerence, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence
level, is consistent with our prediction that customers will obtain more of the manufacturer-
supplied surplus the better informed they are of its existence.
In this column, we also test one additional connection between information and pass-
through rates by exploiting a particular market institution. General Motors oﬀers the “GM
Card,” a credit card that accumulates a rebate toward the purchase of a new GM car. The
amount of rebate a user accumulates is proportional to the amount charged to the card. In
the transactions data, we can identify when a GM Card rebate was applied. This makes
an interesting comparison to customer and dealer cash because this is manufacturer-supplied
surplus for which the customer has an information advantage over the dealer. Hence, we expect
that consumers can appropriate more of the GM card rebate than of either customer cash or
dealer cash. The results follow this prediction: column 1 of Table 2 shows that customers obtain
18106% (statistically indistinguishable from 100%) of the surplus from GM Card rebates.6
The pass-through rates estimated by diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences are very similar to what is
reported in this subsection if, instead of week-segment ﬁxed eﬀects, we use month-subsegment
ﬁxed eﬀects (fewer degrees of freedom longitudinally but more cross-sectionally) or even week-
subsegment ﬁxed eﬀects.
5.2 Regression Discontinuity
The regression discontinuity approach consists of analyzing only transactions that occur im-
mediately before and immediately after a change in a promotion. The idea is that demand
conditions do not change within a short window that includes an event of interest. We choose
a window of one week on either side of a promotion change from zero to some positive amount,
from one amount to another amount, or from some positive amount to zero. In contrast to
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, we have to determine the pass-through of customer cash
and dealer cash promotions in separate estimations: to identify the eﬀect of, for example, cus-
tomer cash promotions, the regression discontinuity approach dictates that we use only data
immediately before and after a change in customer cash promotions but not data surrounding
changes in dealer cash promotions. The analogous procedure applies to estimating dealer cash
promotions.
The regression equation in the regression discontinuity approach is similar to the one used
in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. As equation 2 shows, the measures of promotions,
demographics (Xi), time period controls (Xjt), and car ﬁxed eﬀects (µj) are the same as in
equation 1 above. The regression discontinuity speciﬁcation does not rely on week - vehicle
6One alternative explanation for this ﬁnding is that GM Card holders are “bargain-hunting, penny-pinching”
types and would therefore be likely to negotiate for good prices already. An interpretation of the GM Card
that would give the opposite prediction is that GM Card holders hold the GM Card because they have strong
preferences for GM vehicles, which would make them less likely to negotiate low prices.
19segment ﬁxed eﬀects in order to identify the “treatment eﬀect” of the promotion so τJT does
not appear in equation 2; in its place, we include a week ﬁxed eﬀect, τT.
Pijt = λcCustCashjt+λdDealCashjt+β1Xi+β2Xjt+β3DealerCompij +µj +τT +ijt (2)
When we restrict the sample to observations in the windows surrounding changes in cus-
tomer cash promotions, the coeﬃcient of interest is the coeﬃcient on CustomerCash (λc),
which has the same interpretation as in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. When using
this sample, the coeﬃcient on DealerCash (λd) cannot be interpreted as the pass-through rate
identiﬁed by regression discontinuity, since λd is not identiﬁed by observations immediately
before and after a dealer cash change. Instead, we include DealerCash when using the cus-
tomer cash window sample merely to control for the price eﬀects of dealer cash. The converse
applies when we restrict the sample to observations in the windows surrounding changes in
dealer cash promotions. Then the coeﬃcient of interest is the coeﬃcient on DealerCash (λd),
while CustomerCash merely controls for the price eﬀects of customer cash.
The identifying assumption in this approach is that the underlying willingness-to-pay of
customers who buy just before and just after a change in a promotion is the same. This would
be violated, for example, if there were deal-prone customers with a diﬀerent willingness-to-pay
or bargaining ability, who wait until the begin of a promotion to enter the market. We will
test this identifying assumption in section 6.4.
Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients from the two regression discontinuity speciﬁ-
cations. Overall, both estimates are slightly smaller than the estimates in the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences approach. In column 2a of Table 2, 81% of customer cash is estimated to be passed
through to customers, compared to 31% of dealer cash (in column 2b). Notice that the pass-
through on GM card rebates cannot be estimated with a regression discontinuity approach
20since these rebates do not have a start and end date. We include this variable merely to
control for the price eﬀects of GM card rebates when estimating the pass-through of customer
and dealer cash.
6 Identiﬁcation issues
Having estimated the pass-through rates of customer and dealer cash using both a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences and a regression discontinuity approach, we now test the validity of a series of
assumptions that were maintained when identifying these eﬀects. First, we test an assumption
maintained in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, namely that cars in the same segment
that are not on promotion in a given week are a valid counterfactual for the prices that would
have been obtained on the promoted car in the absence of a promotion. Second, we investigate
the validity of an assumption maintained in the regression discontinuity approach, namely that
the window around a promotion change is suﬃciently small that the estimates measure the
eﬀect of the promotion but not the eﬀect of changes in demand conditions. Third and fourth,
we estimate the validity of another maintained assumption in the regression discontinuity
approach, namely that transaction prices during the week just before the promotion starts are
a valid counterfactual for transaction prices during the ﬁrst promotion week. This assumption
may be violated if dealers react strategically to an upcoming promotion. This assumption may
also be violated if customers who purchase just before a promotion starts and just after it has
started diﬀer in some way that is related to pass-through rates. Fifth, we correct for potential
bias in our estimations due to a violation of an assumption common to both the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences and the regression discontinuity approaches, namely that the distribution of
observable characteristics in treated and untreated groups share a common support. Finally,
we test an assumption that underlies our interpretation that the diﬀerences in pass-through
21rates between promotion types are due to how well consumers are informed about the existence
of each promotion. We will try to rule out that the diﬀerences in pass-through rates are due to
diﬀerences in demand conditions under which manufacturers decide to oﬀer one or the other
type of promotion.
6.1 Test of pre-promotion trends
The maintained assumption underlying the validity of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
is that other cars in the same segment that are not under promotion in a given week are a
valid counterfactual for the prices that would have been obtained on the promoted car in the
absence of a promotion. While we have no way of observing directly whether this assumption
is valid, we can examine the trends of promoted and non-promoted cars in a period prior to
the promotion. If the trends are similar between cars that are soon to be promoted and other
cars, that gives some assurance that the non-promoted cars may be a valid counterfactual in
the promotion period.
To test this, we estimate two daily time trends of price for each vehicle segment for each
month of the sample. One trend is estimated for cars that will go on promotion within 30
days. The other trend is estimated for cars that are not about to go on promotion.
In generating these estimates, we ﬁrst restrict the sample to transactions that occurred on
dates on which the transacted car was on neither a customer cash nor a dealer cash promotion.
Next, we calculate for each observation the earliest date after the observation date (t) that
the car (j) is on either a customer or dealer cash promotion. We denote this as Tjt, the start
date of the next promotion for car j at date t. Using Tjt, we deﬁne an indicator variable
I(Tjt ≤ t + 30), which will equal 1 for all transactions that occur 30 days or less before the
start of a promotion. We then deﬁne the monthly time trend variable as θt,M = n if date t is
22the nth day of month M and θt,M = 0 if date t does not fall in month M. Finally we deﬁne
IJ, an indicator variable that equals one if car j is in segment J.
We then run the following regression:
Pijt = αM + βM,J IJ · θt,M + γM,J IJ · I(Tjt ≤ t + 30) · θt,M + δ1Xi + δ2Xjt + µj + ηijt, (3)
where Pijt is the price paid by customer i for car j at date t in month M, αM is a ﬁxed month
eﬀect, Xi and Xjt are the demographic and time eﬀects from equation 1, and µj are ﬁxed car
eﬀects. The coeﬃcients βM,J will measure the daily trend of prices over the days in month M
for segment J. The γM,J coeﬃcients will measure any diﬀerences in the daily time trend in
month M for prices of cars that are observed within 30 days of the date they will next be on
promotion.7
Our test of equal trends in the pre-promotion period will be testing whether the γM,J coef-
ﬁcients are equal to zero. In unreported results, 19 of the 111 estimated γM,J’s are statistically
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% conﬁdence level, and an additional 5 at the 10% level. While
many coeﬃcients are statistically indistinguishable from zero individually, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the γM,J’s are jointly statistically diﬀerent from zero.
In light of this, one might ask whether the estimated diﬀerences in pre-promotion trends
that are statistically diﬀerent from zero are large enough to explain the price eﬀects that we
estimated in Table 2, and which we attributed to pass-through. Of the statistically signiﬁcant
γM,J’s, the largest in magnitude that is negative is -11.86 dollars per day; the next largest is
-3.47. The coeﬃcients that we estimated in Table 2 imply that the prices of cars on customer
7We also restrict the sample to transactions from month-segment combinations where we observe at least
10 transactions of cars in that month from that segment which will be on promotion within 30 days and where
we also observe at least 10 transactions of cars in that month from that segment that will not be on promotion
within 30 days.
23cash promotion, controlling for other covariates, are $1056 less than the prices of cars that are
not on promotion (85% estimated pass-through times $1242 average customer cash promotion
amount). In order for this price eﬀect to be explained entirely by the prices for about-to-be-
promoted cars drifting downward by $11.86 more per day than non-promoted cars, it would
have to be the case that the promotion lasted 178 days, about 6 months. For a diﬀerence
of $3.47 in the daily price trend, the promotion would have to last 609 days, or about 20
months, longer than most cars are even available. Since -$11.86 and -$3.47 are the largest of
the estimated time trends, most of which are insigniﬁcant, and since each is estimated only
for one month for one segment, we believe that any bias caused by diﬀerent price trends over
time is not large enough to account for our results.
The estimated price diﬀerence between cars promoted on dealer cash and other cars is
about $326 (35% times an average dealer cash promotion amount of $932). Thus, if price were
trending down by $11.86 per day more for about-to-be-promoted cars than for non-promoted
cars, that would account for an estimated price diﬀerence of $326 after 55 days. A diﬀerential
of $3.47 could not explain the estimated eﬀect unless the promotion lasted for at least 188
days. While the former is not atypical for the length of a dealer cash promotion, the $11.86
diﬀerential is estimated for only one month-segment combination.
These estimates provide little support for the argument that what we estimate as promo-
tional pass-through in Table 2 can be explained as diﬀerences in price trends. The ﬁnding
that about-to-be-promoted cars in most cases do not have diﬀerent price trends from other
cars in the segment just before a promotion starts is also supportive of our use of the prices
of non-promoted cars to control for underlying price trends of promoted cars in the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation.
246.2 Robustness with regard to window size
One maintained assumption in the regression discontinuity approach is that the estimates of λc
and λd measure the pass-through rate of the promotion but not the eﬀect of changes in demand
conditions within the chosen window around a promotion change. This assumption can be
violated if the window is chosen too large. To see this, suppose that retail prices for a car are
declining at 2% per month due to softening demand and that the car’s manufacturer reacts to
the softening demand by oﬀering a promotion equal to 4% of the car’s last average retail price.
Say that half of the promotion amount (2%) is passed on to buyers. A regression discontinuity
approach with one month windows before and after the beginning of the promotion would
identify that prices have decreased by 4%, leading to the incorrect inference that 100% of
the promotion was passed on to consumers. As the window in the regression discontinuity
approach narrows, the probability of misattributing the eﬀect of changing demand conditions
to promotions decreases.
We ﬁnd that the results reported so far are robust to changes in the size of the window
around the promotion event. We reestimate the regressions in columns 2a and 2b of Table 2
using only two days before and after the change in a customer cash or dealer cash promotion.
These results are reported in columns 1a and 1b of Table 3 which show that the estimated
pass-through rates change little. We now estimate that 73% and 26% of customer cash and
dealer cash, respectively, gets passed through to customers.
6.3 Strategic dealer behavior
Another maintained assumption in the regression discontinuity approach is that transaction
prices during the week just before the promotion starts are a valid counterfactual for transaction
prices during the ﬁrst promotion week. This assumption may be violated if dealers react
25strategically to an upcoming promotion. Suppose that a dealer knows when a dealer cash
promotion will begin. Then the dealer should want to sell fewer cars in the days after he or
she has learned of the upcoming promotion, but before the promotion actually starts. This
would increase prices in the pre-promotion period, leading us to overestimate the eﬀect of the
promotion on transaction prices and thereby overestimating the rate of pass-through.
To test whether our maintained assumption is violated, we make use of the fact that dealers
typically ﬁnd out about promotions only 2-3 days before the promotion start date.8 Hence, we
repeat our basic regression discontinuity speciﬁcation, using the original sample of one week
on either side of a promotion change but excluding the 3 days directly before and after a
promotion change. If dealers react strategically to an upcoming promotion, this should not
be reﬂected in this restricted sample. We ﬁnd that the results are very similar to the basic
regression discontinuity speciﬁcation (in columns 2a and 2b of Table 2). We estimate that 82%
and 36% of customer cash and dealer cash, respectively, gets passed through to customers,
compared to 81% and 31% in the basic speciﬁcation (see columns 2a and 2b in Table 3).
This result makes it appear unlikely that pass-through rates are overestimated as a result of
strategic dealer behavior ahead of promotions.
6.4 Pass-through by promotion length
As we have discussed in section 4, identiﬁcation in the regression discontinuity approach would
also be upset if the customers who purchase just before a promotion starts diﬀered in some way
that was related to negotiated prices from customers who purchase just after the promotion
starts. In particular, this would be the case if there are “deal-prone” customers who are
particularly eﬀective negotiators, and who wait to purchase a car until a promotion is oﬀered.
8From discussions with industry experts.
26What this would mean for identiﬁcation is that the set of customers whom we observe buying
before the promotion would pay higher prices on average, with or without a promotion, than
the set of customers whom we observe buying during a promotion would pay, with or without
a promotion. Thus, our pass-through coeﬃcient would wrongly attribute to promotions what
is in fact a price diﬀerence due to unobservable buyer characteristics. While our detailed
demographic data control for important diﬀerences among consumers, we are concerned that
such data may not adequately capture “deal-proneness.”
To estimate whether the pass-through estimate in the regression discontinuity approach
is biased by consumers who “wait for a deal,” we use the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
to estimate how the pass-though rate changes over the life of the promotion. Assuming that
the pent-up demand from customers waiting for a deal comes into the market early and that
these customers are eﬀective negotiators, we should observe a higher pass-through rate at the
beginning of a new or increased promotion than when the promotion has been oﬀered for some
time or has been decreased from the previous level. However, a higher initial pass-through
rate should only be expected for customer cash promotions. This is because consumers are
usually not aware when dealer cash promotions are oﬀered. Hence, deal-prone consumers are
less likely to time their purchase to coincide with the start of a dealer cash promotion.
We build on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation from column 1 in Table 2. We split
the customer cash and dealer cash variables by whether a promotion is an increase or a de-
crease from a previous level; we expect deal-prone consumers to be more likely to buy after a
promotion change only if the promotion is increased.
In addition, we interact the resulting two customer cash and two dealer cash variables with
dummies for whether the transaction occurred when a promotion change had been in place
for 0-14 days, 15-30 days, one to two months, three to six months, or six or more months.
Consistent with our conjecture that there may be some deal-prone consumers, we ﬁnd that the
27pass-through rate for customer cash is greater in weeks 1 and 2 than in all subsequent weeks,
but only for new or increased customer cash promotions. When a customer cash promotion
is new or an increase, pass-through is estimated to be 96% in the ﬁrst two weeks in contrast
to 75-80% for all subsequent weeks (see Table 4). The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two weeks
and later periods is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. When the current customer cash
promotion is a decrease from a previous level, the rate of pass-through does not show any
statistically signiﬁcant change over time. In contrast to customer cash, the pass-through rate
of dealer cash does not show evidence of attracting deal-prone customers. When a dealer cash
promotion is an increase, pass-through rates stay statistically unchanged for the ﬁrst 8 weeks
and then rise, while when a dealer cash promotion is a decrease, there is no discernable pattern
to pass-through rates over time.
These ﬁndings are consistent with some deal-prone consumers waiting to purchase cars
until they become aware that a promotion is being oﬀered. This suggests that the regression
discontinuity approach somewhat overestimates the pass-through rate of customer cash promo-
tions. However, even if we were to use the customer cash pass-through rate for weeks beyond
the second week as estimated in Table 4, which would be 0.80, instead of 0.88 as estimated
in column 1 of Table 2, our qualitative ﬁnding that customer cash gets passed through to
consumers at twice the rate of dealer cash would not change.
6.5 Common support on observables
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach and the regression discontinuity approach give us two
ways to estimate the counterfactual prices that would have been obtained for cars that were
purchased during a promotion had the promotion not been oﬀered. We now address the
problem that these estimated counterfactuals may not lead us to an unbiased estimate of the
28true eﬀect of “treatment on the treated.”
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) decompose the bias that can arise from using the
outcome in non-treated groups to stand in for the (unobservable) outcome in treated groups
had the treatment not occurred. One component of bias that they identify is non-overlapping
support in observable characteristics. There may be cars that are promoted for which there
are no comparable cars which are not promoted, and vice versa, cars that are unpromoted for
which there are no comparable cars that are promoted. There may also be customers who
buy under a promotion for whom there are no comparable customers that do not buy with
a promotion, and vice versa, customers that buy without a promotion for whom there are
no customers who buy under a promotion. This might lead us to conclude that part of the
estimated price diﬀerence we observe is attributable to treatment when it is in fact attributable
to diﬀerences between the support of cars that are and are not promoted, or customers who
buy with and without a promotion.
A second source of bias is diﬀerences in the distributions of observable characteristics in
either car or customer characteristics between promotion and non-promotion groups, even
within a region of common support. This could lead us attribute price diﬀerences to treatment
(promotion) when they are actually due to diﬀerences in the average characteristics of “treated”
and “non-treated” cars and customers.
The third and ﬁnal component of bias that Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd identify is
diﬀerences in outcomes that arise within a region of common support and conditioning on
observable characteristics. This component is what is usually referred to as selection bias.
In this subsection we use a propensity score approach to minimize the bias arising from non-
overlapping support (see, for example, Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2004)), the ﬁrst
source of bias described above. To control for bias caused by diﬀerences in car and customer
observables between promotion and non-promotion subsamples, the second source describe
29above, we have used in all speciﬁcations a large set of consumer characteristics and detailed
car ﬁxed eﬀects as covariates.
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd argue that frequently these two components are larger than
the bias arising from selection on unobservables. Selection bias would arise in our case if
customers “select into treatment” on the basis of the gains they would obtain. This is the
issue we investigated in section 6.4 where we looked for evidence that customers who are
inherently good price negotiators are also more likely to buy under promotions.
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences with common support
We use a propensity score approach to ensure common support in observable characteristics
between treatment and control observations. This approach estimates for each observation
in the sample the probability (a “propensity score”) that, conditional on all observables, the
observation is in the treatment as opposed to the control group. The resulting propensity scores
are used to ensure that there are no observations in the treatment group whose propensity
scores lie outside the range of propensity scores of observations in the control group, and vice
versa. The advantage of the propensity score approach is that there need not be a common
support between treatment and control group observations on each observable characteristic.
Instead, to remove the bias from a non-overlapping support in observable characteristics, it
suﬃces to ensure a common support in the distribution of propensity scores between the
treatment and control groups.
One complication in our setting is that we have multiple treatments, namely customer cash
and dealer cash promotions. Recently, Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) have extended the
standard model underlying the propensity score approach from one to multiple treatments. The
key point is to be able to extend to multiple treatments the property of the propensity score
that it can be used as a single dimensional measure by which to ﬁnd matching observations
30across treatment and control groups. Both papers show that the propensity score approach
can be adapted to preserve this property, what is referred to as the “balancing score property
of the propensity score,” in a multiple treatment environment. We follow the approach of these
papers to restrict the sample to observations with common support in observable characteristics
between the multiple promotion states.
We proceed as follows: Using a multinomial logit model, we ﬁrst estimate the probabil-
ity that the sold car was in each of the four promotion states si ∈ S = {“no promotion,”
“only customer cash promotion,” “only dealer cash promotion,” and “customer and dealer
cash promotion”}. We estimate these probabilities as a function of the customer characteris-
tics, the detailed car dummies, the region, and the competition variable used in all previous
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcations. For each pair of states si,sj ∈ S,i 6= j, we then calcu-
late Prob(si|si,sj), the probability that a purchase transaction occurs in state si conditional
on the transaction having occurred either in state si or sj. This way we calculate a propensity
score for the promotion state si (as the “treatment”) relative to each other promotion state sj
(as its “control”). For each such pair of states we identify observations on the common support
by (1) excluding all observations in “control” state sj whose propensity scores are lower than
the minimum of the distribution of propensity scores for the observations in “treatment” state
si and by (2) excluding all “treatment” state observations whose propensity scores are higher
than the maximum of the distribution of “control” state propensity scores. Thus, we are left
with a set of observations which lie in the common support of all promotion states. This pro-
cedure ensures that, controlling for observables, every observation in the sample, irrespective
of which promotion state it represents, can serve as a control for any other observation. This
reduces the sample from 133,424 to 41,533 observations. The decline in the number of obser-
vations is mostly due to the fact that our procedure excludes cars that are never promoted,
that are always promoted with one but not the other type of cash, or that are always promoted
31with both types of cash.
In column 3 of Table 3 we re-estimate the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation reported in
column 1 of Table 2, but using as the estimation sample the common support sample described
in the previous paragraph. In comparing the columns we see that adjusting the sample so that
observations share a common support brings the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates of the pass-
through rates close to the estimates of the regression discontinuity speciﬁcation in columns 2a
and 2b of Table 2. The estimates indicate that 84% of customer cash is passed through to
customers while only 31% of dealer cash reaches buyers, a diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.9
Regression discontinuity with common support
In the regression discontinuity approach we want to ﬁnd the region of common support in
observables between those transactions that took place in the week on one side of a promotion
change and those transactions that took place in the week on the other side of the promotion
change. Since we have to estimate the pass-through rates of customer and dealer cash promo-
tions in separate regressions, we calculate the region of common support for each regression
separately. For the customer cash regression, we start with the sample of transactions that
occurred within a week before or a week after the start, end, or change in size of a customer
cash promotion. We then estimate propensity scores from a logit model of the probability
that, of the two weeks surrounding a customer cash promotion change, the transaction oc-
curred in the week with the higher promotion amount. If the promotion change is the start of
a promotion or a promotion amount increase, the later week will have the higher promotion
9This ﬁnding is robust to more restrictive ways of deﬁning a common support. In particular, instead of
using the minimum and maximum of the distributions of propensity scores to determine the common support,
we have also used the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, the 1st and 99th percentile, and the 2nd and 98th percentiles
as cut-oﬀs. The number of observations in the common support drop to 14,862, 8422, and 2923, respectively.
The estimated pass-through rates are 88% (customer cash) and 36% (dealer cash), 86% and 32%, and 67% and
27%, respectively.
32amount. If the promotion change is the end of a promotion or a promotion amount decrease,
the earlier week will be the week with the higher promotion amount. The explanatory variables
are the customer characteristics, the detailed car dummies, the region, and the competition
variable. We identify observations on the common support by (1) excluding all observations
from the control state (the “zero or lower promotion amount weeks”) whose propensity scores
are lower than the minimum of the distribution of propensity scores for the observations in
treatment state (the “higher promotion amount weeks”) and by (2) excluding all treatment
state observations whose propensity scores are higher than the maximum of the distribution of
control state propensity scores. This reduces the number of observations in the customer cash
regression from 6296 to 6185. The procedure for ﬁnding the region of common support for the
dealer cash regression is analogous and reduces the number of observations in the dealer cash
regression from 7046 to 6974.
Notice that the propensity score approach eliminates far fewer observations in the regres-
sion discontinuity approach than in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. This is because the
regression discontinuity approach already restricts the sample to cars which change their pro-
motion status, leaving out cars that are never promoted or always promoted at the same level.
This also indicates that there is close to complete overlap in the observable characteristics of
buyers between transactions which occurred in the week before and after a promotion change.
In comparing columns 2a and 2b of Table 2 and columns 4a and 4b of Table 3 we see that
adjusting the sample so that observations share a common support changes the estimates very
little. The estimate of customer cash pass-through remains 81% while the estimate of dealer
cash pass-through increases from 31% to 32%.10
10As in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation, the regression discontinuity results are robust to more
restrictive ways of deﬁning a common support. In particular, instead of using the minimum and maximum
of the distributions of propensity scores to determine the common support, we have also used the 0.5 and
99.5 percentiles, the 1st and 99th percentile, and the 2nd and 98th percentiles as cut-oﬀs. The number of
observations in the common support of the customer cash sample drop to 5959, 5814, and 5553, respectively.
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We have attributed the diﬀerence in pass-through rates between the two promotion types to
diﬀerences in how well consumers are informed about the existence of these promotions. This
attribution needs to be treated with caution. Our estimates indicate the average pass-through
of a customer cash promotion in periods in which manufacturers chose to have customer cash
promotions and the average pass-through of a dealer cash promotion in periods in which man-
ufacturers chose to have dealer cash promotions. So far our results do not necessarily imply
that the pass-through of a promotion would increase if a manufacturer were to switch from
a dealer cash to a customer cash promotion of equal amount. In particular, if each type of
promotion is well suited to a particular conﬁguration of market conditions, and manufacturers
want to maximize promotion pass-through, it may be that manufacturers are optimally match-
ing promotions to particular conditions. This is a concern even if we are correctly estimating
customer and dealer cash pass-through rates in the states in which they are used. This concern
pertains to the interpretation of the diﬀerence, not to the estimates of the diﬀerence itself.
In this section we will try to rule out that the diﬀerences in pass-through rates are due to
diﬀerences in market conditions under which manufacturers decide to oﬀer one or the other
type of promotion. We proceed as follows: We use measures of market conditions to explicitly
model the probability that a car on promotion is promoted either with customer cash or with
dealer cash. This estimation yields the predicted probability for each transaction that the car
is sold on a customer cash as opposed to a dealer cash promotion. We use this probability
as a propensity score to exclude observations from the estimation for which there are no
comparable market conditions across the two promotion states. This leaves us with a sample
The estimated pass-through rates for customer cash are 81%, 81%, and 83% respectively. The number of
observations in the common support of the dealer cash sample drop to 6707, 6594, and 6321, respectively. The
estimated pass-through rates for dealer cash are 32%, 33%, and 31%, respectively.
34which contains only cars that were sold on promotion, and which share a common support in
observable market conditions across customer and dealer cash promotions. Finally, we use this
sample to identify pass-through rates while explicitly controlling for the market conditions on
which manufacturers base their decision to oﬀer one or the other type of promotion.
Industry sources tell us that the primary variables that manufacturers use when deciding
whether to initiate a promotion are vehicle proﬁtability at the dealer level, inventory level,
total vehicle sales, and market share within the vehicle’s subsegment. Depending on the
speciﬁc auto manufacturer, these variables are monitored on a weekly or monthly basis.11 In
rare cases, promotions are initiated on the basis of information about market conditions that
is as recent as two weeks. More commonly, the lag between the information used and the
promotion decision is one to three months.
We want to use these decision variables to model the promotion choice process of manufac-
turers and as controls in the estimation of promotion pass-through. We do not expect, however,
that the above variables will describe perfectly the choice of promotion. In part this is because
we know that there are diﬀerences among manufacturers in the promotion decision process. In
part, this is because manufacturers have additional considerations when choosing promotions
besides matching the most eﬀective promotion to the demand condition. Anecdotally, we know
that dealers communicate to manufacturers through ﬁeld reps that they prefer dealer cash to
customer cash, arguing that dealer cash gives them more ﬂexibility.12 While manufacturers
and dealers in the automotive sector are separate entities, each party is clearly dependent on
the other in many ways, having made multiple relationship speciﬁc investments. Hence, while
11One of the authors of this paper consulted with several auto manufacturers in improving their promotion
decision system.
12Evidence for this can also be found in the 1995 complaint of the DOJ against the National Automotive
Dealer Association: “On numerous occasions between 1989 and 1992, the NADA urged manufacturers to give
franchised dealers, rather than consumers, all of the discounts and incentives oﬀered by manufacturers to induce
the purchase of a new car.” (Paragraph 14, page 4.)
35we expect the promotion decision to be explained in part by observable demand conditions,
there will also be unobservable elements driving the decision, including the importance of and
current state of dealer-manufacturer relations.
To model the promotion choice process we consider only promotions which followed a
period of no promotions. This is so that the lagged measures of market conditions on which
manufacturers base their promotion decisions (sales, days of inventory, dealer proﬁtability,
etc.) are not themselves aﬀected by the existence of an earlier promotion. To be able to
use measures of market conditions which reﬂect the lag between information and promotion
decision commonly found at auto manufacturers, we only consider the ﬁrst 30 days of any
promotion. This way we can use one month lagged measures of market conditions without
worrying that these measures are aﬀected by the promotion they triggered. Consequently, our
sample to model the promotion choice process consists of transactions for which (1) the car
was sold either with a dealer cash promotion or a customer cash promotion, (2) the transaction
occurred within the ﬁrst 30 days of the promotion, and (3) the car was not on any type of
promotion preceding the start of the current promotion.
To model the promotion choice process of manufacturers we estimate a logit model where
the dependent variable is one if the car is oﬀered with a customer cash promotion and zero if
it is oﬀered with a dealer cash promotion. Using our knowledge of the decision making process
at manufacturers, our key explanatory variables are monthly changes in dealer proﬁtability,
market share (within subsegment), sales, and inventory level; all measures are speciﬁc to the
transacted model. We include changes in these variables from three months to two months
and from two months to one month before a promotions starts, and also control for the levels
of these variables one, two, and three months prior to the start of the promotion. We also
include customer characteristics, detailed car dummies, region, and competition eﬀects to
ensure common support in observable consumer and car characteristics. This ensures that the
36resulting propensity score shares a common support between customer cash and dealer cash
observations with regards to observable car characteristics and consumer characteristics, as
well as pre-promotion market conditions.
In the logit model we ﬁnd that a decrease in dealer proﬁtability is associated with a higher
probability that a car will be oﬀered with dealer cash as opposed to customer cash (see Table 5).
Since our estimates so far have shown that dealers obtain more of the surplus from dealer
cash than they would from an equivalently sized customer cash promotion, it is perhaps not
surprising that manufacturers apparently oﬀer dealer cash in response to low dealer margins.
This behavior is consistent with an argument by Klein and Murphy (1988) and Klein (1995)
in the context of franchising. Klein (1995) argues that an upstream ﬁrm must leave rents for
the downstream ﬁrm if it wants to be able to inﬂuence the behavior of the downstream ﬁrm by
threatening the loss of future rents. Our other three explanatory variables in the promotion
prediction logit have to do with sales in some way or other: market share, sales, and inventory
levels. The logit coeﬃcients indicate that a decrease in market share is associated with a with
a higher probability that a car will be oﬀered with customer cash as opposed to dealer cash. A
decrease in sales or an increase in inventory levels, however, is associated with a with a higher
probability that a car will be oﬀered with dealer cash. We do not have an explanation based
in what we know of the process by which manufacturers plan promotions, why a decrease in
market share would lead to customer cash while a decrease in sales or increase in inventory
would lead to dealer cash. From a statistical point of view, however, the explanatory variables
do a reasonably good job at predicting which type of promotion will be oﬀered: the pseudo
R2 of the logit estimation is 0.58. An estimation of the logit without any measures of market
conditions yields a pseudo R2 of 0.34, indicating that the market condition measures have some
power in explaining whether a promotion is oﬀered in form of customer or dealer cash.
The logit yields a propensity score which we use to identify observations on the common
37support. We identify observations on the common support by (1) excluding all observations in
the control state (“car was oﬀered with dealer cash”) whose propensity scores are lower than
the minimum of the distribution of propensity scores for the observations in the treatment state
(“car was oﬀered with customer cash”) and by (2) excluding all treatment state observations
whose propensity scores are higher than the maximum of the distribution of control state
propensity scores. This reduces the number of observations to 3939.
We repeat our basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences pass-through speciﬁcation with two changes.
First, we include week ﬁxed eﬀects instead of week-segment ﬁxed eﬀects since we do not have
enough degrees of freedom to identify week-segment ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, we control for the
lagged measures of market conditions used to predict whether a car will be oﬀered with dealer
cash or customer cash. The results suggest that, controlling for the market conditions under
which manufacturers choose one or the other type of promotion, the pass-through rates for
customer cash remain at least twice as large as the pass-through rates for dealer cash and
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 1% level (see Table 6). While the point estimates
indicate that 102% of customer cash and 48% of dealer cash is passed through, the conﬁdence
intervals are large enough to accommodate, for example, the estimates of 88% and 39% found
in the original diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2.13
This ﬁnding makes it less likely that diﬀerences in market conditions under which man-
ufacturers decide to oﬀer one or the other type of promotion are alone responsible for the
diﬀerences in pass-through rates between customer and dealer cash. While our somewhat
coarse measures of market conditions cannot perfectly capture the promotion generation pro-
13As in prior speciﬁcations, the qualitative comparison of customer cash and dealer cash pass-through is
robust to more restrictive ways of deﬁning a common support. In particular, instead of using the minimum
and maximum of the distributions of propensity scores to determine the common support, we have also used the
0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, the 1st and 99th percentile, and the 2nd and 98th percentiles as cut-oﬀs. The number
of observations in the common support drop to 3684, 2978, and 1993, respectively. The estimated pass-through
rates are 105% (customer cash) and 42% (dealer cash), 94% and 35%, and 107% and 50%, respectively.
38cess, we do think they are suﬃciently informative measures that if a substantial portion of the
diﬀerence between dealer cash and customer cash pass-through rates were due to diﬀerences in
market conditions, adjusting for common support and controlling for market conditions would
decrease the diﬀerence between the estimated pass-through rates. The fact that this has not
happened gives us more conﬁdence that the diﬀerence between dealer cash and customer cash
pass-through estimates is attributable to diﬀerences in how well consumers are informed about
the existence of these promotions.
6.7 A non-bargaining explanation
We would like to brieﬂy discuss one simple alternative explanation outside of a bargaining
framework for the estimated pass-through rate of dealer cash. Suppose that car dealers have
local monopoly power and that transaction prices correspond (to some approximation) to the
posted prices set by a monopolistic ﬁrm. If this were the case, then the static “marginal revenue
equals marginal cost” price optimization would dictate that one half of any cut in wholesale
price should be passed on to consumers. If we think of dealer cash as a wholesale price cut,
this would predict a 50% pass-through rate for dealer cash in our estimates. A brief review of
our estimates so far shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that our dealer cash estimates
are diﬀerent from 0.5. The problem with this explanation is that it cannot easily explain our
customer cash pass-through rate. For example, if we were to interpret also customer cash as a
wholesale price cut (it is not obvious one should), we should expect a similar pass-through rate
as for dealer cash. This is clearly not what we ﬁnd; we consistently reject that the customer
cash estimate is 0.5. We also reject the hypothesis that, in contrast to wholesale price cut in
form of dealer cash, customer cash is simply ignored by dealers in making pricing decisions; in
most estimations we reject the hypothesis that consumers receive 100% of the customer cash.
397 Extensions
We now consider a number of extensions to our basic speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst analyze how com-
petition aﬀects pass-through. Next, we investigate how pass-through varies by customer demo-
graphics. Finally, we consider possible demand eﬀects from advertising which may accompany
customer cash promotions. For brevity, in all cases we use only the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
speciﬁcation.
The eﬀect of competition on pass-through
In column 1 of Table 7 we interact the promotions variables with our measure of dealer com-
petition. We anticipate that a customer who has several dealerships nearby will be able to
negotiate lower prices because he or she can easily negotiate – or threaten to negotiate – with
multiple dealers. Although our previous results have not shown a statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fect of dealer competition on prices themselves, here we test whether dealer competition leads
to higher rates of pass-through of customer cash. We might observe this if the presence of
a customer cash rebate increases the amount of surplus a customer believes is up for grabs
in the negotiation, and this encourages customers to actually undertake the costly process of
negotiating with an additional dealer. Under this intuition, we would not expect competition
to increase the rate of pass-through of dealer cash because customers, being uninformed about
the availability of dealer cash, would not have any increased incentive to play dealers oﬀ one
another.
Consistent with our prediction, in column 1 of Table 7, the coeﬃcient estimates imply that
while a dealership without competing dealerships of the same nameplate within 10 miles will
pass through 84% of customer cash, this rate of pass-through will increase by one percentage
point for every additional dealer of the same nameplate in that 10 mile radius. Also, consistent
with our expectations, competition has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the rate of dealer
40cash pass-through.
Competing promotions
A nearby dealership of the same nameplate is one kind of outside options that might increase a
customer’s negotiating leverage; an alternative vehicle in the same subsegment is another kind
of outside option that could allow a customer to negotiate more eﬀectively. In this extension
we consider the eﬀect on one vehicle’s price of promotions currently available on other vehicles
in the same segment. We expect that promotions available on alternative vehicles will lower
the expected price of those vehicles, lowering the price to which a dealer must agree in order
to sell a car for which promoted cars might substitute.
In column 1 of Table 7 we add to the regression variables measuring the number of customer
and dealer cash promotions currently available on competing vehicles in the same vehicle
segment. In the estimated results, neither the number of competing customer cash oﬀers nor
the number of competing dealer cash oﬀers has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices.
In column 2 of Table 7 we use alternative measures to try to capture the same eﬀect,
namely the average level of customer and dealer cash currently available on competing vehicles
in the same vehicle segment. We construct these measures by averaging the customer cash (or
dealer cash) available on a given day on competing vehicles in the same segment, weighting
the average by each competing car’s average market share during the year. In the results
reported in column 2, customer cash on competing vehicles has no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on prices, but dealer cash available on competing vehicles lowers transactions prices: the
estimated coeﬃcient indicates that increasing the average dealer cash available on competing
vehicles by $50 (for example, if one of 10 competing vehicles introduced a $500 dealer cash
promotion) would lower the transaction price by about $14. While we expected that both
types of competing promotions could lower prices, we ﬁnd such an eﬀect only for competing
41dealer cash promotions.
Notice that in this speciﬁcation we include only week ﬁxed eﬀects since these ‘average
competing promotion in segment’ variables together with the vehicle’s own promotion are
colinear with the week - segment ﬁxed eﬀects. For this reason we continue with the ‘number
of customer and dealer cash promotions’ variable in subsequent speciﬁcations.
Pass-through by demographics
Previous empirical studies of automotive retailing have found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in prices
paid by customers with diﬀerent demographic characteristics, especially race and gender (Ayres
and Siegelman 1995, Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2003). This extension exam-
ines whether there are analogous diﬀerences in pass-through rates.
In column 3, we interact the customer cash and dealer cash measures with three demo-
graphic measures, namely whether the customer is female, and the percentage of the customer’s
census block group that is black or Hispanic (which can be thought of as the probability that
the customer is black or Hispanic14). The positive coeﬃcients estimated for these variables
indicate that women, blacks, and Hispanics obtain less promotional surplus in the negotiation
process. The estimated eﬀect for women is 4 percentage points less pass-through of customer
cash and 7 percentage points less pass-through of dealer cash than for men. The eﬀects for
blacks and Hispanics are much larger: 32 and 44 percentage points respectively less pass-
through of customer cash, and for Hispanics 28 percentage points less pass-through of dealer
cash.
Using the fraction of transactions that occur under each type of promotion and the average
promotion amount of each type of promotion, we can calculate how much of the direct eﬀect
of these demographic factors on transaction prices is due to female, black, and Hispanic buyers
14See Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) for a detailed discussion of this interpretation.
42getting lower rates of pass-through than white male or Asian buyers. The average price eﬀect
of pass-through rate diﬀerences is roughly equal to diﬀerences between columns 1 and 3 in the
estimated coeﬃcients on Female, %Black, and %Hispanic. Approximately 17% of the higher
price paid by women, and approximately 20% of the higher price paid by blacks appears to be
attributable to lower rates of pass-through on promotions. Although Hispanics are predicted
to receive lower rates of pass-through than whites, the direct eﬀect of being Hispanic on prices
estimated in column 3 is negative, making the combined average eﬀect of being Hispanic on
prices statistically zero.
Further investigation into why women and racial minorities obtain lower rates of pass-
through of promotional surplus is beyond the scope of this paper. However, these results are
consistent with the ﬁndings of Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) on the eﬀect
of such demographic characteristics on overall prices.
Demand eﬀects from advertising of customer cash
In comparing the rates of pass-through of customer cash and of dealer cash, we have interpreted
the estimated diﬀerences to be diﬀerences in the eﬀect of information on the price negotiation
process. Part of what has enabled us to do so is that customer cash deals are widely advertised
on television, radio, and in newspapers. However, we recognize that advertising itself is likely
to have an eﬀect on the demand for a car. In column 4 of Table 7, we investigate the eﬀect of
advertising on our estimated customer cash pass-through rates.
In order to identify the eﬀect of advertising on pass-through rates, we make use of in-
tertemporal variation in customer cash; manufacturers not only begin and end promotions,
they also adjust promotion amounts up and down. We believe that the beginnings of pro-
motions or increases in promotion amounts are likely to be advertised, but that the end of a
promotion or a decrease in the amount of a promotion is much less likely to be advertised.
43Therefore, in column 4 we introduce a variable called CustomerCash*CustomerCash decrease
which is an interaction of the currently available customer cash amount, and an indicator
variable for whether this amount is a decrease from the customer cash amount available imme-
diately preceding this promotion.15 The idea behind the interaction term is that the variable
CustomerCash will estimate the pass-through rate of customer cash when it is accompanied
by advertising, while CustomerCash*CustomerCash decrease will measure how much the pass-
through rate diﬀers when the promotion is unadvertised. An analogous variable is deﬁned for
dealer cash.
The estimates in column 4 indicate that when the current customer cash promotion is an
increase from what was previously oﬀered, 74% is passed through to customers. If the current
promotion is a decrease from what was previously oﬀered, 96% of the surplus is passed through
to customers. There are two ways to interpret this ﬁnding. One is that the advertising that
accompanies customer cash promotions raises customers’ reservation prices in their negotiations
with dealers. Since there is less advertising when promotion amounts decrease, customers
who buy during these periods will have lower reservation prices and will obtain more of the
promotion amount. Alternatively, our ﬁnding could be the result of customers coming into
the dealership expecting to receive a previously advertised larger promotion that is no longer
available. This expectation could reduce their reservation prices, enabling them to extract
more of the promotional surplus from the dealer.
Regardless of the interpretation of these ﬁndings, including the promotion decrease indica-
tors does not alter our conclusion that customer cash pass-through is higher than dealer cash
pass-through. In column 4, 41% of dealer cash is passed through, and there is no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant diﬀerence when the current promotion level is a decrease. This is signiﬁcantly
15For example, if there were no promotion in January, then a $750 promotion for the month of February,
followed by a $500 promotion for the month of March, then CustomerCash * CustomerCash decrease would
be zero for the months of January and February and $500 for the month of March.
44smaller than either estimate of the customer cash pass-through.
8 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed how the information asymmetry between dealers and consumers about
manufacturer-supplied surplus aﬀects the division of this surplus in customer-dealer negotia-
tions. Overall, our results tell a remarkably consistent story across approaches and across
speciﬁcations. Customers obtain 70-90% of the surplus supplied by manufacturers in customer
cash promotions, but only 30-40% of the surplus in dealer cash promotions. Customers also
obtain all the surplus available through the GM Card.
We have tested the validity of a series of assumptions that were maintained when identi-
fying pass-through rates using both a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and a regression discontinuity
approach. First, we have analyzed whether non-promoted cars in the same segment are a valid
counterfactual for promoted cars — an assumption maintained in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach. We have found that non-promoted cars are not a perfect control for promoted cars,
however, that the potential bias is not large enough to change our conclusions. Second, we
have analyzed whether the window around a promotion change is suﬃciently small that the
estimates measure the eﬀect of the promotion but not the eﬀect of changes in demand condi-
tions — an assumption maintained in the regression discontinuity approach. We conﬁrm that
this is the case: the results obtained with a one-week window are substantially the same as
those obtained with a very small (2 day) window. Third, we have investigated whether there is
any evidence that dealers behave strategically by encouraging customers who might buy just
before a promotion starts to come back and buy during the promotion. If this were happening,
it could increase the observed pre-promotion prices, increasing our estimated pass-through
rates in the regression discontinuity approach. We do not ﬁnd evidence that strategic dealer
45behavior inﬂuences our estimates. Fourth, we have investigated whether deal-prone consumers
wait to purchase a car until a customer cash promotion is on — the regression discontinuity
approach assumes that they do not. We have found evidence consistent with promotions at-
tracting deal-prone consumers, however, the potential bias in the pass-through rate is small
and does not change our substantive ﬁndings. Fifth, we have analyzed whether promotion and
non-promotion observations are drawn from a common support. We have found that not all
observations are, but that our results do not change once the sample is restricted to observa-
tion on a common support. Finally, we have analyzed whether the diﬀerences in promotion
pass-through rates are attributable to promotions being matched to market condition. Using
industry information on how promotions are chosen, we ﬁnd no such evidence.
We conclude that the diﬀerence between dealer cash and customer cash pass-through es-
timates are most likely attributable to diﬀerences in how well consumers are informed about
the existence of these promotion. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that when
customers are at an information disadvantage, they are disadvantaged in negotiations. In the
setting of car manufacturer promotions this information disadvantage is substantial: for a pro-
motion of average size, consumers receive $500 less of the surplus if they do not know that
the promotion is on the table. To our knowledge, this is one of very few measurements of how
important information asymmetries in product markets are in practice.
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50Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Price 133424 25490 23487 10382 5988 109755
Customer Cash 34296 1242 1000 669 10 7805
GM Card 1204 1934 1785 1215 2 7043
Dealer Cash 24620 932 700 819 200 5000
Sales Manager Incen. 2319 141 50 181 20 500
Sales Rep Incen. 3601 147 75 154 25 500
# CustCash Prom. in Seg. 133424 6 6 4.7 0 17
# DealCash Prom. in Seg. 133424 2.9 2 2.5 0 13
Avg. CustCash Prom. in Seg. 133424 231 191 209 0 1254
Avg. DealCash Prom. in Seg. 133424 112 53 155 0 2305
# Competing Dealers 133424 3.7 3 2.8 0 24
Female 133424 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
%Asian 133424 0.11 0.064 0.12 0 0.97
%Black 133424 0.033 0.011 0.083 0 1
%BlueCollar 133424 0.23 0.2 0.15 0 1
%CollegeGrad 133424 0.36 0.35 0.18 0 1
%Hispanic 133424 0.13 0.096 0.1 0 0.55
%LessHighSchool 133424 0.1 0.074 0.1 0 1
%HouseOwnership 133424 0.69 0.76 0.24 0.0043 1
%Executives 133424 0.19 0.19 0.083 0 1
%Professional 133424 0.19 0.18 0.091 0 1
%Technicians 133424 0.031 0.028 0.022 0 1
Income 133424 6.5 6.2 2.8 1.1 15
Income2 133424 49 38 43 1.1 225
MediaHHSize 133424 2.9 2.8 0.57 1.5 6
MedianHouseVal. 133424 2.6 2.4 1.2 0.075 5
Weekend 133424 0.27 0 0.44 0 1
EndOfMonth 133424 0.22 0 0.41 0 1
EndOfYear 133424 0.026 0 0.16 0 1
SouthernCal 133424 0.48 0 0.5 0 1
† For Customer Cash, GM Card, Dealer Cash, Sales Manager Incentives, and Sales Rep In-
centives, “N” reports the number of non-zero observations. Hence, the summary statistics
reﬂect observations with non-zero values.
51Table 2: Price eﬀects, basic results†
(1) (2a) (2b)
Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Reg. Disc.
Customer Cash -0.88 -0.81 -0.78
(0.03)** (0.07)** (0.12)**
Dealer Cash -0.39 -0.38 -0.31
(0.07)** (0.14)** (0.07)**
GM Card -1.06 -1.13 -1.13
(0.03)** (0.10)** (0.09)**
Competition -7.66 -15.03 -18.63
(5.60) (9.59) (9.63)+
Female 144.17 139.74 203.25
(12.01)** (45.20)** (57.59)**
%Asian -261.75 -188.40 -115.40
(61.95)** (239.89) (173.48)
%Black 474.48 605.65 470.96
(92.72)** (381.97) (251.97)+
%BlueCollar 208.11 766.91 398.17
(89.62)* (366.29)* (355.60)
%College -283.87 -103.70 -132.31
(86.40)** (300.31) (271.87)
%Hispanic -36.43 -936.23 -68.13
(86.37) (352.61)** (343.59)
%LessHighSchool -166.54 -276.23 -363.69
(111.15) (422.61) (451.70)
%HouseOwnership 14.57 -59.68 52.05
(35.88) (161.61) (142.31)
%Executive 253.73 542.61 -404.04
(113.07)* (501.99) (517.10)
%Professional 217.33 -268.76 231.95
(119.99)+ (406.52) (426.55)
%Technicians 147.06 -101.90 -500.29
(236.15) (1166.86) (1190.77)
MedianHHIncome -21.17 -30.22 -49.37
(11.07)+ (55.34) (46.16)
(MedianHHInc.)2 3.01 2.99 3.79
(0.60)** (3.19) (2.32)
MedianHHSize -24.95 22.45 54.37
(13.59)+ (59.12) (47.24)
MedianHouseVal. -8.10 -0.80 7.91
(10.35) (36.52) (36.05)
Weekend -27.51 -124.92 -107.97
(16.79) (76.11) (49.35)*
EndOfMonth -55.57 -90.90 -93.05
(16.61)** (71.22) (58.23)
EndOfYear 14.61 133.47 -1265.44
(69.49) (321.75) (192.47)**
ModelMonth5-13 31.46 231.02 -156.72
(36.42) (181.81) (183.77)
ModelMonth14+ -99.24 156.11 -172.80
(55.96)+ (268.65) (322.56)
SouthernCal -243.03 -227.94 -274.99
(48.64)** (107.87)* (107.55)*
Constant 26610.52 23482.33 24598.77
(163.18)** (555.17)** (798.96)**
Car ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Other ﬁxed eﬀects Week*Segment Week Week
Observations 133424 6296 7046
Adj. R-squared 0.97 0.95 0.95
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level.
Robust SEs in parentheses.
† MedianHouseValue in $100,000. Income in $1000. 52Table 3: Price eﬀects, identiﬁcation issues (I)†
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3) (4a) (4b)
Reg. Disc. Reg. Disc. Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Reg. Disc.
2 day window 3 days excluded Common Support
Customer Cash -0.73 -0.91 -0.82 -0.73 -0.84 -0.81 -0.79
(0.10)** (0.23)** (0.10)** (0.13)** (0.05)** (0.07)** (0.12)**
Dealer Cash -0.38 -0.26 -0.34 -0.36 -0.31 -0.40 -0.32
(0.19)* (0.11)* (0.17)* (0.09)* (0.06)** (0.13)** (0.08)**
GM Card -1.14 -1.10 -1.19 -1.09 -1.10 -1.13 -1.13
(0.12)** (0.12)** (0.13)** (0.10)** (0.07)** (0.10)** (0.09)**
Competition -10.17 -12.48 -15.59 -16.62 -6.00 -13.68 -19.22
(21.66) (19.15) (14.04) (11.42) (7.40) (9.41) (9.71)*
Weekend -270.01 -165.10 -133.32 -111.61 -12.38 -117.75 -101.04
(134.93)* (161.72) (98.29)* (77.17) (37.13) (77.04) (49.79)*
EndOfMonth -2.79 -259.34 -29.92 151.06 -66.89 -95.35 -99.63
(170.11) (110.69)* (131.55) (123.16)* (26.58)* (70.86) (57.86)+
EndOfYear -2161.76 -1962.62 136.75 -1346.84 156.98 85.53 -1,271.96
(1826.86) (881.00)* (382.81) (251.90)* (118.98) (320.19) (191.88)**
ModelMonth5-13 553.27 681.95 -18.36 -165.51 112.86 262.79 -150.75
(430.82) (677.67) (198.90) (232.87) (66.01)+ (186.66) (174.87)
ModelMonth14+ 680.05 1021.50 -56.88 -183.71 95.06 161.85 -167.23
(577.90) (987.31) (327.29) (407.46) (95.99) (276.07) (316.93)
SouthernCal -206.83 -300.83 -271.58 -207.98 -344.32 -216.15 -269.45
(178.41) (205.10) (129.36) (128.42) (94.09)** (106.41)* (109.50)*
Constant 22610.47 25148.66 23057.55 28811.47 25638.43 23,392.12 25,832.64
(802.37)** (761.60)** (1215.90)** (588.46)** (322.51)** (609.74)** (555.13)**
Car ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other ﬁxed eﬀects Week Week Week Week Week*Seg. Week Week
Observations 2017 2099 3476 3999 41533 6181 6914
Adj. R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust SEs in parentheses.
† Unreported demographic characteristics include: census block percentages of residents who are college graduates;
with less than high school education; who are blue collar workers, executives, professionals, or technicians; who are
Asian, black, or Hispanic; who are female; and who own their homes; as well as census block-level median income
and median income squared, median household size, and median house value.
53Table 4: Price eﬀects, identiﬁcation issues (II)†
(1) continued...
Customer Cash (increase) -.96 GM Card -1.07
(weeks 1 and 2) (.03)** (.033)**
Customer Cash (increase) -.80 Competition -7.35
(weeks 3 and 4) (.04)** (5.59)
Customer Cash (increase) -.80 Weekend -27.94
(weeks 5 to 8) (.03)** (16.77)+
Customer Cash (increase) -.77 EndOfMonth -56.09
(weeks 9 to 26) (.04)** (16.61)**
Customer Cash (increase) -.75 EndOfYear 15.41
(weeks 26 +) (.06)** (69.17)
Customer Cash (decrease) -.84 ModelMonth5-13 31.94
(weeks 1 and 2) (.08)** (36.03)
Customer Cash (decrease) -.88 ModelMonth14+ -103.04
(weeks 3 and 4) (.08)** (57.39)+
Customer Cash (decrease) -.92 SouthernCal -243.49
(weeks 5 to 8) (.06)** (48.56)**
Customer Cash (decrease) -.91 Constant 26644.62
(weeks 9 to 26) (.07)** (164.92)**
Customer Cash (decrease) -1.27
(weeks 26 +) (.11)**
Dealer Cash (increase) -.28
(weeks 1 and 2) (.06)**
Dealer Cash (increase) -.35
(weeks 3 and 4) (.06)**
Dealer Cash (increase) -.38
(weeks 5 to 8) (.08)**
Dealer Cash (increase) -.48
(weeks 9 to 26) (.08)**
Dealer Cash (increase) -.42
(weeks 26 +) (.14)**
Dealer Cash (decrease) -.33
(weeks 1 and 2) (.19)+
Dealer Cash (decrease) -.49
(weeks 3 and 4) (.20)*
Dealer Cash (decrease) -.22
(weeks 5 to 8) (.23)
Dealer Cash (decrease) -1.05
(weeks 9 to 26) (.13)**
Dealer Cash (decrease) -.42
(weeks 26 +) (.28)
Car ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Other ﬁxed eﬀects Week*Segment
Observations 133642
R-squared 0.97
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust
SEs in parentheses.
† Unreported demographic characteristics include: census block percentages
of residents who are college graduates; with less than high school education;
who are blue collar workers, executives, professionals, or technicians; who are
Asian, black, or Hispanic; who are female; and who own their homes; as well
as census block-level median income and median income squared, median
household size, and median house value.
54Table 5: Choice of promotion†
Logit of customer cash (1) vs. dealer cash (0)
(1) continued...
Female 0.06 ∆ Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-2 to T-1) 66.87
(0.12) (4.74)**
%Asian 0.18 ∆ Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-3 to T-2) 4.45
(0.58) (3.38)
%Black -0.56 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-1) -0.01
(0.70) (0.00)**
%BlueCollar 1.72 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-2) 0.01
(0.88)+ (0.00)**
%CollegeGrad 1.33 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-3) 0.00
(0.81) (0.00)
%Hispanic -1.11 ∆ Segm. Market Share (T-2 to T-1) -20.29
(0.87) (6.12)**
%LessHighSchool -0.75 ∆ Segm. Market Share (T-3 to T-2) -71.79
(1.13) (6.03)**
%HouseOwnership 0.43 Segm. Market Share (T-1) 98.45
(0.37) (17.94)**
%Executives -0.64 Segm. Market Share (T-2) 105.98
(1.19) (19.03)**
%Professional -0.79 Segm. Market Share (T-3) -57.22
(1.17) (13.82)**
%Technicians 0.14 ∆ Sales (T-2 to T-1) 12.39
(2.85) (2.97)**
Income -0.08 ∆ Sales (T-3 to T-2) 35.82
(0.12) (3.15)**
Income2 0.00 Sales (T-1) -0.01
(0.01) (0.00)*
MediaHHSize 0.14 Sales (T-2) -0.03
(0.15) (0.00)**
MedianHouseVal. 0.08 Sales (T-3) 0.00
(0.09) (0.00)
# Competing Dealers -0.09 ∆ Inventory (T-3 to T-2) -9.29
(0.02)** (2.03)**
SouthernCal -0.03 Inventory (T-1) 0.01
(0.16) (0.00)**
Model Age -0.32 Inventory (T-2) -0.04
(0.05)** (0.00)**
ModelMonth1-4 1.85 Inventory (T-3) 0.04
(0.61)** (0.00)**




∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust SEs in
parentheses. MedianHouseValue in $100,000. Income in $1000.
† Sample includes only transactions for which (1) the car was sold either with a dealer
cash promotion or a customer cash promotion, (2) the transaction occurred within the
ﬁrst 30 days of the promotion, and (3) the car was not on any type of promotion
preceding the start of the current promotion.
55Table 6: Pass-through controlling for market conditions and common support†
(1) continued...
Customer Cash -1.02 ∆ Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-2 to T-1) -3,296.14
(0.08)** (2,006.64)
Dealer Cash -0.48 ∆ Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-3 to T-2) -1,131.45
(0.12)** (1,677.42)
# Competing Dealers -9.16 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-1) 0.74
(16.96) (0.65)
Female 104.78 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-2) -0.85
(68.51) (0.70)
%Asian -560.90 Veh. Proﬁt Margin (T-3) -0.72
(273.24)* (0.45)
%Black -27.04 ∆ Segm. Market Share (T-2 to T-1) -7,255.56
(498.02) (4,028.62)+
%BlueCollar -127.28 ∆ Segm. Market Share (T-3 to T-2) 6,188.64
(458.51) (4,472.44)
%CollegeGrad -218.91 Segm. Market Share (T-1) 14,131.38
(506.91) (13,497.33)
%Hispanic 17.62 Segm. Market Share (T-2) -22,247.33
(368.77) (10,538.93)*
%LessHighSchool -769.80 Segm. Market Share (T-3) -983.61
(596.04) (7,067.90)
%HouseOwnership 83.25 ∆ Sales (T-2 to T-1) 3,178.21
(187.48) (2,040.37)
%Executives -271.80 ∆ Sales (T-3 to T-2) -2,715.93
(587.30) (2,303.78)
%Professional -178.75 Sales (T-1) -3.07
(749.31) (2.39)
%Technicians 344.52 Sales (T-2) 4.48
(1,646.84) (2.40)+
Income -126.74 Sales (T-3) -0.10
(84.68) (1.74)
Income2 9.79 ∆ Inventory (T-2 to T-1) 0.00
(4.90)+ (0.00)
MediaHHSize 10.31 ∆ Inventory (T-3 to T-2) -419.76
(72.24) (1,393.21)
MedianHouseVal. -18.46 Inventory (T-1) 0.04
(44.35) (1.62)
Weekend 30.11 Inventory (T-2) -1.28
(65.45) (3.20)
EndOfMonth 99.21 Inventory (T-3) 3.61
(122.39) (3.18)








Car ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Week ﬁxed eﬀects Yes
Observations 3939
R-squared 0.96
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust SEs in paren-
theses. MedianHouseValue in $100,000. Income in $1000.
† Sample includes only transactions for which (1) the car was sold either with a dealer cash
promotion or a customer cash promotion, (2) the transaction occurred within the ﬁrst 30
days of the promotion, (3) the car was not on any type of promotion preceding the start
of the current promotion, and (4) the transaction is in the common support on observable
market conditions, consumer characteristics, and car characteristics.
56Table 7: Extensions†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ
Customer Cash -0.84 -0.82 -0.90 -0.74
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)**
Dealer Cash -0.42 -0.52 -0.47 -0.41
(0.07)** (0.09)** (0.08)** (0.07)**
GM Card -1.03 -1.02 -1.02 -1.04
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)**
CustCash*Competition -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.004)* (0.005)* (0.005)* (0.004)*
DealCash*Competition 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Num. CustCash Prom. in Seg. 21.53 21.65 19.40
(14.21) (14.19) (14.09)
Num. DealCash Prom. in Seg. -15.26 -14.73 -11.32
(16.94) (16.80) (16.77)
Avg. CustCash Prom. in Seg. 0.18
(0.13)






# Competing Dealers -4.87 -5.79 -4.15 -4.48
(6.75) (6.80) (6.82) (6.75)
Female 144.40 146.34 120.72 143.78
(12.00)** (12.05)** (13.50)** (11.97)**
%Black 473.90 476.36 365.69 473.38
(92.79)** (94.39)** (93.47)** (93.14)**
%Hispanic -32.62 -32.24 -229.67 -27.99













Constant 26565 26607 26609 26627
(165)** (180)** (165)** (166)**
Other ﬁxed eﬀects Week*Segment Week Week*Segment Week*Segment
Car ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 133424 133424 133424 133424
Adj. R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust SEs in parentheses.
† Unreported demographic characteristics include: census block percentages of residents who are
college graduates; with less than high school education; who are blue collar workers, executives,
professionals, or technicians; who are Asian; and who own their homes; as well as census block-
level median income and median income squared, median household size, and median house value.
Unreported controls include whether the transaction occurred on the weekend, at the end of the
month, or at the end of the year; the time since the model introduction; and whether the transaction
took place in Southern California.
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